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Privacy at Your Fingertips - The Right of an Acquitted
To Retrieve Fingerprint and Photograph Records
The petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of assault and bat-
tery. She was photographed and fingerprinted by the Seattle Police Department,
and those photographs and fingerprints were placed in the department files.
Following the dismissal of charges against her at trial, she requested the return
of the photographs, their negatives, and the fingerprints. The acting chief of
police refused to return these items. After this refusal the petitioner sought a
writ of mandate directing the acting chief of police to return all the photo-
graphs, negatives, and fingerprints. Although no basis was given for either the
taking or the retention of the fingerprints and photographs, the trial court
refused to issue the writ and held that she had no right to their return even
though she had been acquitted. Held, reversed: When one is acquitted of a
criminal charge, he has a fundamental right to the return of the fingerprints
and photographs taken incident to investigation of the crime, and this right
cannot be curtailed absent the showing of a compelling interest in the retention
of such fingerprints and photographs. Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1971).
I. THE RETENTION OF IDENTIFICATION RECORDS
Although the right of arresting authorities to fingerprint and photograph
an arrestee has been well established, whether the law enforcement agencies
may thereafter retain fingerprint records has not been clearly resolved.' In
those cases in which the arrestee has been tried and convicted, retention of
1 A large body of statutory and case law has developed regarding both the fingerprinting
and the photographing of arrestees. For example, in all but three states some reference to
fingerprints or fingerprinting may be found in statutes. These three states are Colorado,
South Carolina, and Tennessee. A. MOENSSENS, FINGERPRINTS AND THE LAW 39 (1969).
As for case law, it has become well established that the police have the right to take finger-
prints and photographs of an accused before trial. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417, cert. denied, 196
U.S. 639 (1904); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909); Howard v. State,
453 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
In United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932), which dealt with the so-called
common-law right of arresting authorities to fingerprint an arrestee, a federal district court
directed a United States attorney to return a defendant's fingerprint records. The court
so ordered, stating that neither state nor federal statutes authorized the taking of finger-
prints and that such action subjected the arrestee to unnecessary indignity. The circuit court's
opinion, reversing the lower court decision, stated that "as a physical invasion it [finger-
printing] amounts to almost nothing and as a humiliation it can never amount to as much
as that caused by the publicity attending a sensational indictment to which innocent men
may have to submit." Id. at 70. Kelly is persuasive authority for the proposition that the
right to gather such information may be extended to cover misdemeanants unless a statute
expressly provides to the contrary. A. MOENSSENS, supra, at 43.
The New Jersey and Texas courts have specifically held that such authority exists. Bart-
letta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 A. 17, 18 (Ch. 1930), aff'd per curiam, 109
N.J. Eq. 241, 156 A. 658 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931): "In the performance of this duty [of
preventing crime, apprehending criminals, and gathering evidence), they [the police] may
use any apt and reasonable means which do not invade the rights of the accused .... "
Owensby v. Morris, 79 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935): "[Wle
hold that a peace officer who has good cause to believe and does believe, that a person is
then compounding a crime, for which the officer will be under a duty to procure his arrest,
may detain him, take his fingerprints, have him photographed and otherwise detain him,
for the protection of society ....
(Vol. 26
fingerprint records has invariably been found to be within the state's authority.!
But when the arrestee has been tried and acquitted this issue has not been
settled since the arrestee may claim that fingerprinting is an unlawful invasion
of privacy.
With the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,' the right to be free from
governmental intrusion was under some circumstances recognized by the
United States Supreme Court as a constitutional guarantee. The right was said
to emanate from the first amendment's protection of freedom of association,
the third amendment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the fourth
amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, the fifth
amendment's protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
ninth amendment's reservation of additional, unspecified rights to the people."
Thus, this "zone of privacy" stems in part from fundamental constitutional
guarantees.'
Pre-Griswold cases had held that the retention of the fingerprints of an ac-
quitted person was not a violation of the right of privacy, and had stated that
the right is limited in such cases by the reasonable demands of society for the
collective health, safety, and welfare of the entire citizenry.6 Thus, these cases
appear to have turned on a balancing of the citizen's freedom from govern-
mental intrusion with the police powers of the state. But such a balancing test
would appear to be inapplicable today since the term "balancing" would
normally indicate a simple weighing of the individual's right against society's.
Instead, when a "fundamental right" is involved, the individual interest is
presumptively of greater weight than the societal interest.' It is clear that in
order to justify the regulation by the state of such a fundamental right, the
state must show a compelling need.!
On the federal level the question of whether an acquitted person's right of
privacy compels the return of identification records taken after his arrest seems
to have been resolved on the grounds of reasonableness. That is, the federal
'See, e.g., Hodgeman v. Olsen, 83 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915). See also A.
MOENSSENS, supra note 1, at 89.
3381 U.S. 479 (1965). "[Slpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life and substance." Id. at 484.
Justice Douglas referred to a "zone of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees."
Id. The Douglas formulation of a "right to privacy" suggests a potentially wide field for
application of the concept of "emanations and penumbras." This was the first time that
a "constitutional right of privacy" had been given explicit recognition as an independent
doctrine. M. SLOUGH, PRIVACY, FREEDOM, AND RESPONSIBILITY 59 (1969).
'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
'Id. at 485. The term "fundamental" implies that such rights are applicable to the
states by way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Furthermore, the term suggests that the traditional test
of compliance with the due process clause, a test of reasonableness, is inapplicable to such
rights. "Where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged
by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationships-
to the effectuation of a proper state purpose." 381 U.S. at 497, citing Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Does the fact that the right
of privacy is based upon emanations from fundamental rights dictate that the right of pri-
vacy also be considered fundamental? The opinion in Griswold seems to treat the right
of privacy as fundamental without. considering this question.
'See, e.g., Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946).
'See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (concurring opinion);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
'Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
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courts appear to have applied a balancing test in those cases in which the
acquitted's right of privacy has been vindicated.' In one recent federal case"0
the court posed the question of whether "a citizen with a criminal identification
file [should] be haunted by fingerprints labelled 'criminal' when he has no
charges pending against him."11 The court determined that the retention of an
acquitted's records was a violation of his right to privacy. This decision em-
ployed the reasoning that when an accused is acquitted of the crime, or when
he is discharged without conviction, the retention of criminal identification
records serves no public interest, although it imposes a burden upon the citizen.
Even more recently, a federal court has held that the mere fact that the plaintiff
had been arrested did not justify the retention of his fingerprints and record of
his detention in criminal identification files. 2 Thus, while the federal courts
have determined that an acquitted is entitled to the return of his identification
records, they have not reached that conclusion through the explicit application
of a compelling interest test.
On the state level, two well-defined lines of cases have developed. One
adopts the principle that the individual interest in privacy, whether a right or
not, is limited by the reasonable interest of society in the retention of such
records." The other holds that the preservation of these records constitutes an
unwarranted attack upon character and reputation and violates the citizen's
right of privacy, as well as his dignity as a human being."4 The New Jersey
courts" have adopted the first approach. Their reasoning has been that, be-
cause of the state's concern for the safety of its people, private life ceases to be
private when one has been indicted." The rationale for the retention of an
acquitted's identification records is that, should the acquitted ever be subse-
quently arrested, he would then be more conveniently identified. Although
both federal and some state authorities seem to apply a similar test (one which
demands the demonstration of a rational basis), contravening results have
been reached by these two bodies. It should also be noted that the weight of
'Judge Augustus Hand noted that United States attorneys and marshals are instructed
by the United States Attorney not to make public photographs or fingerprints prior to
trial and are required to destroy all such records after acquittal or when a prisoner is dis-
charged without conviction. See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932).
But see Stevenson v. United States, 380 F.2d 590, 594 (D.C. Cit. 1967), in which it is
noted that under the United States Marshal's Manual, fingerprints are not to be returned
to a defendant, whether or not he is acquitted of a charge.
1"United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
" Id. at 970.
"Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750, 770 (1950).
"'See, e.g., Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941); Itzkovitch v. Whit-
aker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 499 (1905), af'd, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906).
"See, e.g., McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq. 341, 54 A.2d 469 (Ch. 1947). The
court said: "[C]hanging conditions necessarily impose a greater demand upon that reserve
element of sovereignty called the police power, for such reasonable supervision and regula-
tion as may be essential for the common welfare." Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
"6 It should be pointed out that perhaps a distinction exists between merely being ar-
rested and being both arrested and indicted when referring to the return of fingerprint
records.
'"Texas appellate courts take the position that identification records of an individual,
against whom no complaint was filed, do not have to be destroyed or expunged, and that
failure to do so does not constitute an invasion of privacy. Justification for such a conclusion
has been grounded on the idea that this is an administrative procedure of the police to
which an individual must at times be subjected for the sake of the common good. Hansson
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state authority appears to favor the public interest over the private when the
retention of an acquitted's identification records is at issue."
The contrary line of state authority is exemplified by a surprisingly early
Louisiana case." In that case the court granted a request for the return of
identification records on the ground that no public good could be served by
exhibiting the picture of an honest man. The case is perhaps too early to have
dealt with the question in terms of any test other than reasonability. Neverthe-
less, it illustrates that the problem has not traditionally been approached as one
involving a fundamental constitutional right. Despite the variation in results,
all the cases appear to deal uniformly with the problem by employing the
balancing of the private and public interests in light of the circumstances of
each particular situation.
II. EDDY V. MOORE
In Eddy v. Moore'° the Washington Court of Appeals recognized that an
acquitted has a fundamental right of privacy which includes the right to the
return of his fingerprints and photographs following acquittal. In so holding
the court adopted a course in distinct contrast to the dominant state authority
which has evolved regarding the subject. Furthermore, the court has apparently
gone beyond the reasoning of the federal cases which have dealt with the
question, as well as the reasoning of the minority view among the states.
The court traced the historical development of the general rule allowing
identification records of arrested persons to be retained by the police in their
discretion for the protection of society. However, the court frequently men-
tioned exceptions to the general rule as enunciated by both writers" and legal
precedent. 2 In dicta the court expounded at length on the right of privacy, and
in closing, that discussion led to a formulation of the issue of the case: whether
an acquitted, absent a showing of compelling interest by the state, has the
right to the return of fingerprint records on the basis of the fundamental right
of privacy.
The court pointed out the direct correlation between the loss of individual
privacy and the retention of arrest records by stating that one who has been
arrested and then acquitted has an "undeniably greater visibility to the police
than other persons."' However, the court dispelled any implication that the
v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952), error ref. n.r.e.; Owensby
v. Morris, 79 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935).
"Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962); Mavity
v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq.
341, 54 A.2d 469 (Ch. 1947); Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (Ch.
1930); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952), error ref. n.r.e.
"ltzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 499 (1905), afl'd, 117 La. 708, 42
So. 228 (1906). See also Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 66 (1942); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 130
(1933).
20487 P.2d 211 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
" Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
" Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 499 (1905), afl'd, 117 La. 708, 42 So.
228 (1906); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 83 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
"487 P.2d at 216. Not only will the arrestee be subject to greater visibility to the
police, but also to a private sector of life (i.e., potential employers). Reports indicate that
there is evidence that many employers make improper use of arrest records, thus making
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decision was an absolute bar to any retention by emphatically stating that the
principle enunciated in the case applied only when there was no compelling
interest for retaining such records. Thus, the departure of Eddy from all of the
earlier authority on this question lies in the fact that an acquitted person's in-
terest in the return of his identification records is characterized as a fundamental
right, and that interest cannot be subordinated to the interest of the state in
retaining the records merely by showing some rational basis for their retention.
The court did not believe that the imposition of the "compelling showing of
necessity" standard imposed any undue burden on the state. As analagous
authority for the application of this standard, the court compared the present
situation with the stringent requirements which a law enforcement official must
meet to justify the intrusion into a man's home.24 In both situations the interest
in the individual right of privacy is presumptively greater.' In light of the
state's failure to rebut such a presumption, it followed that Mrs. Eddy should
be allowed to retrieve her identification records.
II. CONCLUSION
The state's interest in the public safety justifies the retention of a criminal's
identification records. Such reasoning, however, cannot justify the retention of
the acquitted person's identification records.' Any argument which finds some
justification for the retention of an acquitted's records operates on the fallacious
assumption that one who has been arrested but acquitted is more likely than
the person who has never been arrested to commit a crime in the future. Even
more puzzling is the idea that such retention would have a deterrent effect on
future criminal conduct. It is doubtful that many would-be criminals stop
before committing a crime to think about whether their identification records
the search for employment more discouraging. In trying to explain the circumstances of the
arrest to the would-be employer, the arrestee-applicant hopes the employer will be satisfied
with the explanation given, but many times the potential employee's arrest record will cast
a shadow of uncertainty as to his character and as a consequence the arrestee will not be
given the job sought. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE-THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967).
2 4Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
2 The analogy used by the court seems strange because the fourth amendment is couched
in terms of reasonableness. However, the standards for permitting a search are more than
reasonableness (i.e. probable cause).
"'By retaining an arrestee's records in a "criminal identification file," the arrestee is
being placed in a category along with those convicted of crimes. The arrestee should not
have to suffer the personal indignity of having his records retained by law enforcement
officials when records of other non-acquitted citizens are not present in such a file. What
reason does the state have to retain non-criminal records in a criminal file? "The only time
arrest records can be a useful tool for determining which persons have engaged in criminal
activity is when police consistently arrest those who commit crime." Comment, Arrest
Records as a Racially Discriminatory Employment Criterion, 6 HARV. Civ. R.-CIV. LIB.
L. REV. 165, 172 (1970). Moreover, the late Director of the F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover, stated
that "it must be understood that the overwhelming majority of F.B.I. reports do not tell a
complete story." Hoover, The Confidential Nature of F.B.I. Reports, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1, 4 (1956). The stigma of a criminal record handicaps the arrestee for the remainder of
his life, for he will have to admit he has arrest records and perhaps try to explain the cir-
cumstances. See Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CALIF. W.L. REV. 126, 127 (1965). See
also 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 825, 830 (1971). However, the "expungement" concept, a
method to combat extrajudicial penalization, may be an alternative. By utilizing this con-
cept, the record of an individual's past is kept from hampering his future endeavors. See
Pettler & Hilmer, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from the
General Public Access, 3 CALIF. W.L. REv. 121, 125 (1967).
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are on file. Even if they did, the probability is great that they would not refrain
from committing the crime merely because their fingerprints have been pre-
viously recorded. Thus, the retention of an acquitted's identification records
does not appear to be defensible on grounds of reasonableness. Why, then, did
the Washington court choose to apply the compelling interest test? Because
the right to privacy is fundamental, the more stringent standard is applicable.
However, the conclusion that the right of privacy is fundamental must rest
on the assumption that the penumbral rights which emanate from fundamental
constitutional guarantees necessarily take on the quality of fundamentality
themselves. The majority opinion in Griswold points out that the zone of
privacy is created by such fundamental guarantees."7 But whether the right of
privacy is itself fundamental is not apparent." With the exception of Eddy, no
case seems to have reached this conclusion. The failure of the Washington
court to give more attention to this position is the only significant flaw in its
otherwise well-reasoned analysis.
Larry Van Smith
7 381 U.S. at 485.
28 Id. at 491. Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurrence, however, did not reach this question.
His conclusion, in which Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice joined, is in keeping with
the assumption in Eddy-that the right of privacy is fundamental in the sense that only a
compelling interest can justify its dilution.
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